Case 1:17-cr-00047-DLC Document 141 Filed 09/26/17 Page 1 of 31

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 17 CR 0047 (DLC) V. 5 MAHMOUD THIAM, Defendant. 6 7 -----x 8 New York, N.Y. August 25, 2017 9 11:34 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. DENISE COTE, 12 District Judge 13 14 **APPEARANCES** 15 JOON H. KIM, Acting United States Attorney for the 16 Southern District of New York 17 ELISHA KOBRE CHRISTOPHER DiMASE 18 Assistant United States Attorneys LORINDA LARYEA 19 Department of Justice Attorney 20 AARON M. GOLDSMITH JONATHAN ISIDOR EDELSTEIN 21 Attorneys for Defendant 22 ALSO PRESENT: SPECIAL AGENT CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ, FBI 23 ALEXANDER BEER, Paralegal to AUSAs 24 JENNIE CARMONA, Paralegal to Mr. Goldsmith 25

1 (In open court) (Case called) 2 3 MR. KOBRE: Good morning, your Honor. Elisha Kobre, 4 Lorinda Laryea and Christopher DiMase for the government, and 5 with us at counsel table, as well, Special Agent Christopher 6 Martinez with the FBI, and Alex Beer, a paralegal from our 7 office. 8 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Thank you. And for the defendant, 9 are you ready? 10 MR. GOLDSMITH: Ready. Aaron Goldsmith on behalf of Mr. Thiam, who's present in court this morning. With me at 11 12 counsel table is also Jennie Carmona, paralegal, and Jonathan 13 Edelstein, who recently appeared. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. Can I see counsel at the 15 sidebar, please. 16 (At the side bar) 17 THE COURT: So I wanted to raise with counsel what I 18 understand happened before I came on the bench in which the defendant's counsel's paralegal greeted, in a warm embrace, one 19 20 of the marshals --21 MR. GOLDSMITH: Okay. 22 THE COURT: -- in this public courtroom. That should 23 never happen again. 24 MR. GOLDSMITH: Okay. Very well, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

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(In open court)

THE COURT: Let me ask you, Mr. Goldsmith, have you and your client both read the presentence report?

MR. GOLDSMITH: We have.

THE COURT: Have you both discussed it with each other?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you have any objections to it, other than what might be contained in your written sentencing submissions?

MR. GOLDSMITH: No.

THE COURT: Thank you. The presentence report will be made part of the record in this case and placed under seal. If an appeal is taken, counsel on appeal may have accessed to the sealed report without further application to this Court.

You may be seated. Thank you, Mr. Goldsmith.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Well, I guess I should clarify that in my objections, I raised the loss value calculation based upon the three-and-a-half million figure. In going back in preparation of the sentencing, looking not only at the complaint and all the way through, it appeared as though the government had shown a number of about 3 million had actually, for lack of a better term, entered U.S. soil. That was contained in my objection, using the lower figure, but I just wanted to clarify that for the record.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's circle back to that issue because I'm not sure I understand its implications for this. I'm not sure I understand what figures you're relying on, but let me just get through the procedural framework first, and then let's circle back to that.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Thank you.

THE COURT: Good. So we have submissions from defense counsel and from the government in connection with this proceeding. The government's sentencing memorandum was filed on ECF on August 4th. I have the following submissions from defense counsel. I have a letter of July 12th, July 28th, August 23, and August 22 from Mr. Goldsmith. I have a submission of August 14th from Mr. Edelstein.

Now, Mr. Goldsmith, you're appointed counsel in this case.

I understand, Mr. Edelstein, you are not?

MR. EDELSTEIN: I am not, your Honor. You are correct, your Honor. I am not appointed in this case. I have been engaged by the family to review the record for purposes of a possible appeal, and that led me to get involved in some aspects of the sentencing, as well.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm happy to take your submission, Mr. Edelstein but, of course, public funds have been used to pay for appointed counsel, and if the defendant comes into possession of funds such that there should be a reimbursement

to the government for those public funds invested in support of his defense, obviously, that's something that I have a duty to inquire into, and I'm sure you're aware of that.

MR. EDELSTEIN: I am aware of that, your Honor. Once I became aware that Mr. Thiam had been appointed counsel, which I hadn't initially been aware of, and when I found that out, I inquired of Mrs. Thiam regarding the source the funding. And she has stated that the source of the funding comes from relatives in various countries, that none of it is Mr. Thiam's funds.

THE COURT: Thank you so much for clarifying that. I appreciate it.

MR. GOLDSMITH: If I may, for the record, it's also my understanding, in conversations with Mr. Thiam's family and with Mr. Edelstein, that he was only paid out of those funds raised from family a very nominal amount for sentencing review purposes and has not received further funds.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Goldsmith.

Mr. Goldsmith, I think my chambers raised with you the fact that one of the letters submitted with the July 28th submission is illegible.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, you have, and I found them extraordinarily helpful, submitted many letters to me. This is the only one I found to be illegible, but I understand you

don't have a better copy of it.

MR. GOLDSMITH: I do not. Ms. Rojas and I reviewed my copy this morning. It is the same quality that the Court has, but as the Court stated, there were numerous letters from family and friends.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you so much. So I think we're ready to proceed without worrying further about that one letter.

The probation department calculates the offense level here as 32, the criminal history category as I, leading to a guidelines range of 121 to 151 months in prison.

The government has raised an issue as to whether or not there shouldn't be an obstruction of justice enhancement under 3C1.1, which would give us an offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of I, with a guidelines range of 151 months to 188 months in prison.

The defendant seeks a sentence of 60 months. The probation department recommends a sentence of 121 months on Count Two and a concurrent sentence of 120 months on Count One, and that would be at the lowest end of the guidelines range that it calculated.

There is an issue of forfeiture here, with a proposed order of forfeiture here from the government of \$8.5 million. Is there any objection to entry of the forfeiture?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Your Honor, I don't believe Mr. Thiam

has standing to enter an objection at this time because, as there was testimony and exhibits put forth on the record, the title is in another individual's name or corporation's name.

THE COURT: Okay. The defendant making no objection,

I will execute the proposed order of forfeiture.

Let's turn to those two issues that I flagged. One, Mr. Goldsmith, the issue that you raised before about the amount of money. There was proof here at trial, which was really overwhelming, that the bribe amount paid was eight-and-a-half million dollars, but I want to make sure I understand your argument with respect to a lesser sum.

MR. GOLDSMITH: My argument is very clear, that the offense that Mr. Thiam is charged with and was convicted of was laundering of proceeds from the bribe, not the bribe itself.

The U.S. had zero jurisdiction over that bribe. The bribe, taken upon the evidence that was adduced at face value over the testimony of Mr. Thiam, was that that fund, the eight-and-a-half million dollars' worth, remained in Hong Kong. It was not transferred to U.S. soil. There were not payments made in those values to U.S. soil.

The only funds that can be considered by this Court as a loss value, for sentencing purposes, are the funds that actually enter U.S. jurisdiction. Those funds, by the complaint, all the way through the evidence that came forward at trial, was in an amount of about \$3 million, which is the

lesser category, sentencing-wise, which would have been the 16-point enhancement.

So it would have meted out with a base offense level of eight, 16-point enhancement, and the two points for sophistication, which was conceded in the defense sentencing memorandum, which is only metered out to a sentencing guidelines of 63 months at a low end.

So those figures of the amount actually brought into the U.S. versus the total amount alleged by the government to have been received by Mr. Thiam internationally becomes a significant issue in terms of the stipulated -- well, in terms of the guidelines that are appropriate in this case. That was the one concern.

The other concern that I had, in response to the government's calculations, were their request for abuse of trust, which I don't think was proven out in any fashion, and more specifically, this obstruction argument that it appears, in my experience, the U.S. Attorney's Office always makes an argument for if there's a defendant who is convicted after testifying at trial, in some sort of a policy basis of trial tacts, for lack of a better term, without substantial evidence of same.

If they had really felt that Mr. Thiam perjured himself in front of this jury, I have no doubt that the U.S. Attorney's Office would have levied a perjury charge against

him, as I've had that happen in one instance in the past.

Otherwise, I think that not only is this just a rote policy argument by the U.S. Attorney's Office, but also the Court could note that in their summation, the government made reference to an alternative theory, following Mr. Thiam's testimony, about the funds transferred to him from Mr. Pa and his associates being a loan. In which the government asserted to the jury even if it was a loan, you know, it still would have been a loan with no interest to an individual in political office, should be taken, in sum and substance, as a bribe.

So the jury could have very well believed Mr. Thiam's testimony that it was a loan and still believe that it was a bribe, but for those reasons, that's why we take issue with the probation's calculation and the government's argument for enhancements.

THE COURT: Thank you. So let's look at the presentence report. I did not understand from your written sentencing submissions precisely what you're telling me right now, and I thank you for that explanation. So I'm on page 6 of the presentence report, and the paragraph 23 has a base offense level of 26. Now, that includes, from the presentence report's calculation, a base offense level of 8 and then an adjustment because of the amount of laundered funds, which it names as \$8.5 million.

And your argument is that only \$3 million came into

this country?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Correct.

THE COURT: Now, the presentence report indicates that you had argued that 3.5 million had come into this country.

MR. GOLDSMITH: The 3.5 was the threshold that I put in under the guidelines, rather than the actual amount, and as I went in to investigate the matter further in preparation of the sentencing, the numbers that we found, not only from the complaint that was filed in this case through the evidence that was adduced at trial, the number is about 3 million. So it brings it to that lower threshold.

THE COURT: So you would have an offense level of 24 as opposed to 26?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. And then there is another adjustment in the presentence report because of 1956, which is a two-level adjustment. You do not dispute that as appropriate?

MR. GOLDSMITH: No, we do not.

THE COURT: And then special offense characteristics, two levels for use of sophisticated means, et cetera; you do not dispute that?

MR. GOLDSMITH: The problem I have with that, your Honor, is that the sophisticated -- I don't think the transferring money from one account in your name to another

account in your name is sophisticated.

THE COURT: So you are disputing that?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes.

THE COURT: You are or not?

MR. GOLDSMITH: We are.

THE COURT: Okay. Then there is a role in the offense adjustment under 3(b)(1.3), where the probation department includes a two-level enhancement for abuse of trust. Are you disputing that?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Yes.

THE COURT: What is your argument as to why the position of Minister of Mines and taking a bribe in connection with official duties while holding that position is not an abuse of trust?

MR. GOLDSMITH: There was no evidence adduced at trial that Mr. Thiam affirmatively exploited his position, being that he never went out to individuals promising a level of trust and a level of fiduciary responsibility, to then take that money like we might see if an attorney is indicted or if a stockbroker or financial analyst is indicted; that while he had a position that was high-ranking in the government, that, in and of itself, doesn't make him abuse his trust. The abuse of trust is typically exposed when one preys upon the individuals who are trusting of that fiduciary responsibility.

THE COURT: Okay. So I didn't see any of these

arguments developed in the submissions or laws cited to me in connection with these. I'm sorry to take the time now to work through it, but I want to make sure.

MR. GOLDSMITH: I'm glad you are, your Honor. It's important. I note that the only concession that we made in the sentencing memo was the two points under 1956.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm looking at the application notes to 3(b)(1.3), particularly application note one, and this adjustment applies when the position of public trust is characterized by professional or managerial discretion. And, of course, as Minister of Mines, the defendant was given vast discretion in terms of using his position to advise other government ministers and to negotiate on behalf of the nation of Guinea.

Another component is that the position of trust must have contributed in some significant way to facilitating the commission or concealment of the offense.

I find this aspect is also met here with the proof adduced at trial. The bribe was paid by the Chinese officials for the very purpose of influencing the defendant's execution of his job as Minister of Mines during the negotiation of a very lucrative contract that touched upon vast amounts of natural resources of the government of Guinea.

The defendant's acceptance and support of the transaction as Minister of Mines was critical to the

transaction. He was a necessary participant in those discussions. His signature appears on critical documents associated with the transaction. So I find that the two-level enhancement for abuse of trust is appropriately entered by the probation department, and I adopt it as my own.

Let's turn to the amount in connection with the calculation of the base offense level.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Your Honor, if I may briefly interject? I'm sorry to interrupt.

THE COURT: No, I'm sorry, Mr. Goldsmith. I gave you an opportunity to be heard.

MR. GOLDSMITH: Okay.

THE COURT: We're going to move on.

With respect to the consideration of the amount of money for assessing the base offense level, Count One had, and as I charged the jury, five different elements. Among those was that the transaction at issue, the financial transaction at issue, either took place in the United States or took place outside the United States, but the defendant is a United States person. There's no dispute that the financial transaction itself at issue here, the \$8.5 million, was the amount of the bribe paid to the defendant.

Again, I note that it would make a two-level difference with respect to the probation department's calculation, and I believe that the probation department has

correctly calculated it.

Let's turn to the next issue, that specific offense characteristics, the use of sophisticated means, and that is an enhancement that is made under 2S1.1(b)(2)(C)(3). That is an offense level that applies if the defendant was convicted under section 1956, and he was. Therefore, that adjustment is appropriate.

That leaves us the issue about the adjustment for obstruction of justice, and as I understand it, this adjustment is sought by the government for what it contends was the defendant's perjury at trial. That adjustment is under 3C1.1.

First issue, of course, is whether or not there was perjury, and I find that there was, by clear and convincing evidence, indeed, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant gave false testimony under oath at trial. He did so with the specific intent to deceive the jury and to mislead them about what had happened here, and it was, of course, about a material matter. It was in connection with the circumstances under which he received the \$8.5 million. So he hoped to obtain a not guilty verdict by his testimony. Therefore, I find that enhancement under 3C1.1 to also be appropriate.

So I think I've addressed each of the guidelines calculation disputes that have been raised, and so the offense level is 34, the criminal history category is I, the guidelines range is 151 to 188 months.

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There are a number of issues that have been highlighted by the defendant's papers seeking a variance from a quidelines range. They include the great difficulties he confronted when in Guinea; that Guinea is not materially worse off because of the receipt of the bribe or the contract with the Chinese; that a comparable defendant in an FCPA case received a sentence of 24 months; that the receipt of the bribe was an isolated act in an otherwise exemplary life and would be considered properly aberrant behavior; and as well, that he's engaged in a lifetime of good works, at least as an adult, supporting many poor individuals in Africa to obtain higher education, to obtain education in an environment that they would not otherwise have had access to, and in a variety of ways supporting the communities in Africa in which they live. These, I think, are the principal themes of the request for a non-quidelines sentence.

I'll hear from the government.

MR. KOBRE: Just very briefly, your Honor. If I could just start by just addressing two issues that come up in the context of the Court's guidelines rulings, not so much with respect to those rulings, but just because I think they are relevant to your Honor's consideration of the factors, the sentencing factors under section 3553.

The first one relates to the enhancement for sophisticated laundering, and I know that your Honor pointed

out that it applies here because the defendant was convicted under 18 USC 1956, and I would just point out for your Honor, and I know we were all here for trial, that the defendant's offense in this case involved offshore financial accounts and transactions in several different foreign countries in an effort to conceal the source of the proceeds that he was using here in the United States.

Just also to address briefly, with respect to the obstruction, your Honor is correct that the government only sought an obstruction enhancement here based on the defendant's perjury at trial. The government did not, but considered and perhaps could have, sought obstruction here, as well, on the basis of not only the defendant's lies to the FBI during his post-arrest interview, but also as well, under the commentary in the guidelines for the defendant's conduct even pre-investigation, to the extent that it was intended to ultimately thwart the eventual investigation and prosecution of his crimes.

For that, I would point your Honor to application note one, the second paragraph of 3C1.1, which indicates that obstructive conduct that occurred prior to the start of the investigation of the instant offense of conviction may be covered, as well under the obstruction guideline if the conduct was purposely calculated and likely to thwart the investigation or prosecution of the offense of conviction.

Again, the government has not sought obstruction on that basis, or on the basis of the lies to the FBI. I just wanted to point out that that is conduct in the same nature as what occurred here at trial.

I think, your Honor, the government generally just rests on its submission, but I do want to sort of respond to the submission that was put in by co-counsel regarding the harm to Guinea and whether that existed or not. I would just want to make three points on that for your Honor's consideration.

The first is that the evidence at trial showed that, in fact, there was harm to Guinea. As we pointed out in our submission and cited to the transcript, trial transcript, the Court heard testimony from the Daouda Camara, who is a senior advisor to the prime minister, and here is a quote that the sovereign, under the exclusivity provision of the shareholders agreement, the sovereign rights of the Republic of Guinea regarding its natural resources were practically removed from Guinea. And, really, there was no evidence in the record that really contradicted that. So that's the first point.

I would just add to that, your Honor, that putting that issue aside, whether the actual agreement itself was harmful to Guinea, the \$8.5 million that the defendant received is money that deprived — that could have gone to the citizens of Guinea, as opposed to the defendant. So, you know, I think at some point in the defense submission, it is pointed out that

this money did not come from the coffers of the Republic of Guinea. Nonetheless, it is essentially stealing honest services essentially from the Republic of Guinea. And as your Honor heard here at trial, \$8.5 million would go a long way in the Republic of Guinea.

And then third, and last, your Honor, you know, the only reason this issue of harm is before the Court, or only reason why we have this question now, to the extent that it is a question, is that the defendant chose to accept an \$8.5 million bribe in exchange for taking the actions that he did. There's a good reason why, under both Guinean law and under U.S. bribery law, the question of harm, or whether the action would have otherwise been taken, is not required to prove a conviction, and that's because taking a bribe injects an element of self-interest into that decision-making process that shouldn't be there.

And just lastly, your Honor, I'll close with this.

You know, as we pointed out in our submission, we think that in this case, one of the most important factors for the Court to consider is deterrence. These sorts of cases, as we pointed out, are difficult to investigate. They're difficult to prosecute. There are events that occur overseas, records have to be obtained from overseas, and corruption is rampant. And, as the Patriot Act makes clear, Congress took very seriously, in passing that provision, that the U.S. financial systems

definitively not be used to allow the proceeds of that sort of corruption to enter into the United States or to be laundered by citizens of the United States.

So for that reason, your Honor, the government asks that the Court impose a guidelines sentence, as the Court calculated the guidelines earlier today.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Goldsmith.

MR. GOLDSMITH: If it please the Court, Mr. Edelstein would like to respond to the government's response to his submission as to the harm to Guinea.

THE COURT: I'll just hear from you, Mr. Goldsmith.

Thank you. I'm sure you and Mr. Edelstein have consulted significantly on this. Thank you. Do you want a brief moment to speak with him?

MR. GOLDSMITH: One second.

(Pause)

Our brief response is going to the government's argument in its sentencing submission and Mr. Kobre's comments earlier, there was a notion of the loss to the Guinean people about this eight-and-a-half million dollars. There was no indication whatsoever in any discovery, in any evidence, in any testimony at this trial that Mr. Pa, Mr. Leong, or anyone else associated with the Queensland Group entities, ever had any opportunity or intention of taking that eight-and-a-half

million dollars that were transferred to the Hong Kong account and Mr. Thiam, and somehow giving that directly to the people of Guinea or providing infrastructure or anything like that.

So for the government to argue that the Guinean people have suffered a loss from the alleged bribe is without any merit whatsoever, without even any consideration, especially --

THE COURT: You mean a monetary loss?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Any attempt of the loss because, as the Court and the parties are well aware, we worked very diligently to keep the issue of ultimacy away from the jury in considering this case because, even as Mr. Kobre stated this morning, it is irrelevant for this case.

There are issues on both sides. Yes, there was an eight-and-a-half million dollar payment to Mr. Thiam in a Hong Kong account. By the same token, there was testimony from the two fact witnesses, who were members of government at the time, that the government and the country of Guinea, that they needed a massive cash influx in 2010 to operate; that the deal with Chinese International Fund allowed for a \$75 million loan from CIF to the country of Guinea to happen immediately, that allowed for them to operate, allowed for them to have the services for the people, water, food, et cetera; that every member of parliament at the time was in favor of the deal.

All that was isolated from the jury because it is irrelevant to the crime itself, and beyond that scope, as I

said, zero evidence at any stage of this case that Mr. Pa, or his associates, had any intention of somehow taking other money and giving it to the people of Guinea.

Beyond that, the argument, as Mr. Kobre just brought forth, Daouda Camara testified his concerns about the exclusivity portions of the joint venture agreement were belied on cross-examination because while he felt concern about any exclusivity aspect, he also disclaimed a knowledge of whether the severability clause that was included in the contract would have permitted the Guinean government to get out of it.

And it was clear contract law, although I'm professed not an expert in contract law and the clauses in contract law internationally. The contract law was unequivocal in stating that if there's anything that goes against Guinean law, it is null and void in this agreement. And that severability clause was in every agreement that was brought into evidence at this trial.

So the notion that the government argued at trial, and argued again this morning, that the government of Guinea somehow lost any element of sovereignty through any clause that may have promised exclusivity rights in these contracts, is inappropriate and inaccurate because the severability clause commands every contract that is written, it is universal and it is explicitly in those contracts and executed by the parties therein.

So we have the arguments about a loss to the people of Guinea. To the contrary, whatever factually may have happened in this case, it is indisputable from the fact witnesses who testified at this trial from Guinea, that the public of Guinea benefited, at least in the short term, from having a massive influx of cash to run their country. So to those ends, we certainly argue against the arguments — we oppose the arguments brought forth by the government in their submission and this morning.

And in terms of the level of deterrence, the Court quite accurately characterized the defense sentencing arguments that have been put forth in our submission. Under 3553(a), there are other cases that are similar. This is a case that should be taken in isolation, as an isolated incident, even if accepted through the conviction.

The element of deterrence is a powerful one, even under the circumstance. Whether the Court were to give Mr. Thiam a 60-month sentence or 12-month sentence sends a strong message that anyone involved in laundering in the U.S., even if it involves activity overseas, far away from a time distant in the past, will be held accountable.

And in the class of defendants that we typically characterize as white collar that face these offenses, deterrence has a much more profound meaning than we experience in other more commonly characterized street crimes. These are

individuals typically of middle or upper class, typically individuals like Mr. Thiam, who have never been in trouble with the law before, typically who are professionals who face numerous collateral consequences to any negative action in a courtroom that far ripple out beyond the mere sentence.

So deterrence is here. Deterrence has already happened. Mr. Thiam has been in jail since his indictment, since his arrest. He will stand, regardless of the Court's consideration at sentencing, to be in jail for some time longer. He has lost his ability to earn income, lost his ability to provide for his family, likely lost any future opportunities to engage in the financial sectors in this country, certainly in most countries in the world with this particular case, especially with the media attention that it drew internationally.

He is a man who will, whether the Court releases him today, in 50 months, 60 months or a time after, will be a man who has been forever significantly changed going forward as a result of this case alone. There is massive deterrence that is here, even in a case that, under a guidelines calculation, my arguments in submission would be a significant departure from. So in that respect, I wanted to follow up not only with the government's arguments, but also with our submissions previously put forth. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Goldsmith.

Again, I want to compliment you on your extraordinarily impressive performance on behalf of your client at trial.

Mr. Thiam, I'll hear anything you have to say on your own behalf in connection with the sentence. I have read your letter that you submitted to me. I'm happy to have any further statement that you'd like to make.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, if you had time to read my letter, I thank you for that. That's all I have to say. Thank you.

THE COURT: You're welcome.

I found the defense submissions and the government's submission very helpful, but I'm focusing in particular on the many letters that were submitted by people who know and care for the defendant. They helped create a better picture in my mind of who the defendant is and how to place this extraordinarily serious violation of law in context.

I believe that the sentence I will announce here would be the same whether the offense level was 32 or 34 or even 30. I've tried to think holistically, consider the guidelines, but then step back and consider, as I must under 3553(a), everything that I have learned.

The defendant comes from a family that was itself the victim of political upheaval in Guinea. His father was executed, and the defendant became a refugee at a young age.

He thrived abroad and in this country due to his talents, his

hard work and his wonderful family support.

He chose ultimately to settle in this country, to raise his children because, as I understand it, he wanted to give them the advantage of everything that this country might be able to offer to them as they became adults.

At the time of our own country's financial crisis, he was invited to return to Guinea and be its Minister of Mines.

That would require him to leave the comfort of home and family, to leave the security of a life in the United States, give him the opportunity to go to the nation of his birth, a desperately poor country, but one that was very rich in natural resources but that had no real ability to develop its resources without outside investment.

The defendant, as I understand it, didn't find this an easy decision to make, and he consulted with several other people who have written to me. Some advised him against this. Some advised him to do it. I believe he made the decision to go to Guinea out of a desire to help others in his homeland. I believe it was a virtuous decision.

What he found there was a deeply dysfunctional country. Corruption was embedded in the country. Violence was known in the country by those in government and elsewhere.

There was an absence of stable government institutions, absence of rule of law in the way that we know it and, of course, there was deep poverty, which he expected to find and did find.

There was a desperate need for infrastructure. There was a desperate need for employment. There was a desperate need for development. The defendant took upon himself this pivotal position that he was offered. He had the power in that position to act good in the country or not. I have evidence that he tried in many circumstances to act honorably. He saw corruption all around him. He decided ultimately to succumb to corruption, and with that decision, deprived Guinea of his honest services.

I certainly agree with what the defendant has argued in its papers and again to me today, that I don't need to decide whether the eight-and-a-half million dollar bribe he took worsened Guinea's situation financially. I don't even feel I need to decide whether the existence of that bribe altered in any meaningful way the kind of advice he gave Guinea with respect to this contract. I don't think I need to decide whether the contract was in Guinea's interests. I don't think I need to decide whether if he had been a good and faithful servant to Guinea, he could have improved upon its terms, negotiated differently, supported others who were questioning its wisdom at least to some of its provisions.

The undisputed fact is that he took a bribe over a contract that was extraordinarily significant to Guinea and significant to the investors who were pouring resources into Guinea. It was a huge bribe, eight-and-a-half million dollars.

It deprived Guinea of his honest services. It was a violation of Guinean law. It was a violation of American law.

The defendant knew immediately that what he was doing was terribly wrong. He took many steps to conceal what he was doing. He lied to banks repeatedly. He engaged in convoluted financial transactions to disguise what was happening with the funds. He absolutely knew he had betrayed Guinea. And, of course, that kind of corruption, as is reflected here, is profound for any nation. It's profound on different levels when a public official accepts bribes in the performance of their duties.

It deprives a nation of the good judgment and good services and faithful services of its representatives, but beyond that, it destroys a citizenry's confidence in its system of governments, and with that loss of confidence, the understanding within a nation that its officials are corrupt, who are more engaged about looking out for their own financial benefit than for the benefit of the country that they're supposed to serve, the rule of law is undermined and a nation is weakened.

Now, the opportunity for corruption exists everywhere. The question is, how does a nation respond? How does it care about the rule of law and the honest services of its government officials? In the United States, our Congress has spoken. It will not be tolerated. It is a violation of our law, and it's

a violation of our law even when the bribe is paid abroad to a corrupt foreign official if that violation of the foreign country's laws is sufficiently connected to the United States, as the jury found it was here. And, of course, we have a United States citizen receiving that bribe, United States financial institutions being involved in the transfer of those monies, a United States property purchased with those monies.

So that brings me to the question of punishment. What is the appropriate punishment here for this very serious crime? The defendant has done a great deal of good in his life. He has supported numerous charities in Africa. He's helped to educate impoverished youth. I find he went to Guinea to help, not to rob it. I find he did help it in many ways. Sometimes when he spoke out with great courage and wisdom, it was at risk to himself, and his advice was not heeded.

On the other hand, the defendant has shown no remorse for what he did here. I sense no acknowledgment of the deep injury he has done to Guinea and to the rule of law. I even sense a whiff of entitlement.

He indicated -- there's dispute in the evidentiary record about this, about whether he took a salary in Guinea, but he at least took the position that he didn't take a salary in some circumstances. He didn't take reimbursement for travel expenses. He left the comfort of his family and friends in New York and the relative security of life here, compared to

the dangers he faced in Guinea, and so maybe he felt he was entitled to take a bribe. The fact is, he did take one, eight-and-a-half million dollars.

I don't find the sentence outlined, even by revised sentencing guidelines calculations, to be appropriate here.

Even if I found an offense level of 32 or an offense level 34, whatever, I think that the sentencing range is too vast. On the other hand, I don't find that a sentence of 60 months, as the defendant has requested, is appropriate either.

The defendant sentenced in the Eastern District is in no material way comparable in role and circumstances to give any guidance with respect to this.

Considering all the factors I've described here, I'm prepared to impose sentence. Mr. Thiam, please stand. I impose a term of imprisonment of 84 months, to be followed by a term of supervised release of three years, with the following special conditions. You must cooperate in the collection of DNA. You must comply with the standard conditions of supervision. You are subject to the forfeiture order that I have signed today. You must submit to a reasonable search by the probation department. You must seek and maintain full-time employment. You shall provide the probation department access to any and all requested financial information. You may not incur any new credit card charge or open any new credit line without approval of the probation department. You shall notify

the U.S. Attorney's Office for this district within 30 days of any change of mailing or residence address while any portion of the forfeiture remains unpaid.

You shall be supervised by the district of your residence. You shall pay a special assessment of \$200. I decline to impose a fine, given the enormity of the forfeiture order that I have signed.

Counsel, is there any legal reason why I cannot impose the sentence I've described as stated?

MR. KOBRE: Not from the government.

MR. GOLDSMITH: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: I order the sentence I've described on the record to be imposed as stated. I don't believe there are any open counts.

MR. KOBRE: There are not.

THE COURT: I need to advise you of your right to appeal, Mr. Thiam. If you're unable to pay the cost of an appeal, you may apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Any notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days of the judgment of conviction.

I'm going to recommend to the Bureau of Prisons that you be given medical treatment for your diabetes.

Counsel, is there any other requests that you have?

MR. GOLDSMITH: Further request the recommendation
that he be housed as close to the greater New York City area as

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      possible.
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                THE COURT: I will make that recommendation. Anything
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      else?
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                MR. GOLDSMITH: No, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: All right.
                (Adjourned)
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